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NOTE
INTERNATIONAL TRADE IMPLICATIONS OF
POLLUTION CONTROL
Present pollution control efforts of American industry will require
major adjustments in the national economy.1 Although the precise
nature and extent of these adjustments cannot yet be determined,2 one
immediate consequence in many industries has been the channeling of
funds normally spent for modernization and expansion towards the
purchase and maintenance of antipollution equipment facilities. 3 The
impact of pollution control efforts on America's position in international trade may be even more profound.4 There is growing concern
that the cost of pollution control, as reflected in the price of American
industrial goods, will endanger this nation's competitive economic
1

The President's Council on Environmental Quality has noted that radical economic

adjustments may be a necessary and inevitable cost of effective pollution control.
Protecting the environment and reducing the harmful effects of pollution will
not be without adjustments. Some firms and activities will find it difficult to accommodate to new rules. A few may well find it impossible. To deny that there
will be transitional problems, including temporary loss of jobs, would be to deny
that any major shift of resources can be accomplished without some dislocation
and some turmoil.
PRESIDENT's COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, SECOND ANNUAL REPORT 121 (1971) [hereinafter cited as CEQ REPORT].
2 As one recent report noted: "It is important to recognize that many of the issues in
the field have not yet surfaced, nor have the potential problems become widespread and
acute." PRESIDENT'S CoMinM'N ON INT'L TRADE AND INVESTMENT POLICY, UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY IN AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD 129 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
ECONOMIC POLICY REPORT].
3 It has been estimated that manufacturing plants and utilities in the United States
spent at least $1.5 billion on air and water pollution control during 1971. During the next
five years pollution control expenditures should total approximately $20 billion. Bylinsky,
The Mounting Bill for Pollution Control, FORTUNE, July 1971, at 87. The United States
Chamber of Commerce estimates that up to 15% of future capital spending in industry
will be for antipollution equipment. Where Pollution Control Is Slowing Industrial Growth,
U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORT, Aug. 23, 1971, at 50. See generally Environmental Quality,
8 WEEKLY ComP. PREs. Docs., 1216 (Aug. 14, 1972). An executive at Bethelehem Steel
observed that in general it cost twice as much to maintain pollution control equipment as to maintain steelmaking tools. Bylinsky, supra at 180.
4 David Rockefeller, Chairman of the Board, Chase Manhattan Bank, observed: "If
we go about the business of solving our nation's pollution problems without regard to
our competitive position in world markets, we could conceivably price ourselves out of
certain important areas of world trade." Where Pollution Control Is Slowing Industrial
Growth, U.S. Nsws & WORLD REPORT, Aug. 23, 1971, at 47. A similar observation was made
by C.A. Gerstacker, Chairman of the Board, Dow Chemical Co., in a speech delivered
before the Economic Club of Detroit, Feb. 22, 1972. See Gerstacker, Profits and Pollution: The International Scene, 38 VITAL SPEECHES 367, 368 (1972).
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position relative to countries which impose less stringent, and consequently less costly, environmental quality standards. 5 Such a competitive handicap may result in increasing pressure for the erection of new
trade barriers designed to protect American industry. 6 In dealing with
the problems of pollution, therefore, America must be aware not only
of the potential national economic impact of pollution control but of
possible effects on international trade as well.7
I
EFFECTS OF POLLUTION CONTROL ON WORLD TRADE

A.

Production Costs and Competition
Pervasive concern over pollution and environmental deterioration
has led the United States and other industrial nations to enact strict,
comprehensive legislation designed to ensure the preservation of environmental quality.8 The cost to American industry of compliance with
5 The United States is not alone in its concern. As Germany's Minister of the Interior
Genscher observed:
We must.. . avoid a situation in which individual countries exclude themselves
from making investments for environmental protection, thereby securing competitive advantages for their own economy vis-A-vis those countries who do meet their
responsibilities.
Quoted in Russell & Landsberg, International Environmental Problems-A Taxonomy,
172 ScIEC 1307, 1310 (1971).
The Common Market is presently reviewing plans to discuss nontariff barriers, such
as subsidies and tax benefits, which result from pollution control efforts in an attempt to
reduce pollution and to maintain its economic position vis-A-vis countries applying less
stringent controls. See N.Y. Times, April 2, 1972, at 3, col. I.
6 In the context of pollution control, possible trade distortions (see note 7 infra) can
be of two general types. First, tariff and nontariff barriers may be established to prohibit
the importation of products which tend to create pollution during consumption or use,
as, for example, automobiles, high sulphur fuels, or food product imports containing
chemical residues. For a discussion of such consumer based trade disruptions, see ECONOMIC
POLICY REPORT 135-37. Second, tariffs, subsidies, duties, or other devices may aid, prevent,
or inhibit trade patterns which develop in response to variations in pollution control laws
which raise industrial production costs. For a detailed analysis of the economic effects
of pollution control, see Kirgis, Effective Pollution Control in Industrialized Countries:
InternationalEconomic Disincentives, Policy Responses, and the GATT, 70 MICH. L. REv.
860 (1972).
7 The "norm," for the purpose of defining distortions in international trade, is a pattern of trade in which all sectors of the world economy perform at maximum comparative
efficiency. Distortions in the form of tariffs or nontariff barriers tend to modify artificially
relative advantages in capital, labor, natural endowments, or other variables that countries
may possess. For discussions of the principles of free trade, see C. KiNDLEBERGER, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 202-17 (4th ed. 1968); P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS: AN INToDucroRY
ANALYsIs 668-80 (8th ed. 1970).
8 See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-18571 (1970) (United States); National En-
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this new legislation is generally conceded to be staggering. 9 Many of the
American industries most strongly affected 0 not only maintain a significant position in the national economy but are also deeply involved
in primary and secondary transactions in international trade.1
In most instances domestic industry is able to transfer increased
production costs to the consumer through higher prices for products.12
Industries engaged in international trade, however, cannot so easily
meet increased production costs by raising consumer prices. 13 Certain
14
nations do not share America's concern with environmental quality
vironmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970) (United States); Rivers (Prevention
of Pollution) Act of 1951, 14 & 15 Geo. 6, c. 64 (Great Britain). For a description of
legislation in France, Germany, and socialist countries, see ENVIRONMENT, Oct. 1970, at
38-39.
The broad support accorded the recent United Nations Conference on the Human
Environment evidences the extent of the concern over pollution. See generally Eldin, The
Need for Intergovernmental Co-operation and Co-ordination Regarding the Environment,
OECD OBSERVR, Feb. 1971, at 3; Humpstone, Pollution: Precedent and Prospect, 50 FOREIGN AFIRs 325, 335-38 (1972).
While less developed countries are not enthusiastic about pollution control, they have
shown an interest in limiting agricultural and urban pollution. Gardner, U.N. As Policeman, SATURDAY REvixw, Aug. 7, 1971, at 47-50.
9 See note 3 supra.
10 According to the Commission on Environmental Quality, few American industries
will escape increased production costs due to pollution control. The pulp and paper, primary metals, and chemical industries will be especially burdened. CEQ REPORT 123-24. See
also Bylinsky, supra note 3, at 88.
11 Concern in the United States with the trade effects of pollution control is especially
important since the nation has 6% of the world's population, while contributing 40% of
the world's pollution (Treating Pollution as a Business Cost, BUSINESS WEM, Oct. 17, 1970,
at 88) and 21.3% of the world's trade. U.S. Dm"T OF ComMERcE, BUREAU oF THE CENsus,
STATISTICAL ABSTRaACr OF THE UNITED STATES: 1971, at 687. Although a substantial part
of United States export trade consists of goods manufactured without high pollution control costs, approximately 20% is sustained by high polluting industries. Pulp and paper,
petroleum, chemicals, iron and steel, and nonferrous base metals industries are responsible
for more than $7 billion in United States exports per year. CEQ REPORT 132-33. This figure
may be low since it may not take into consideration pollution control costs in non-primary
industries such as motor vehicle manufacturing, the goods and equipment of which com-

prise approximately 10% of American exports.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECrION AGENCY, THE

ECONOMICS OF CLEAN AIR: ANNUAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED

STATES

5-17

(1972).
12 CEQ REPORT 129. But see Diamond, What Business Thinks, FORTUNE, Feb. 1970, at
172 (only 24% of domestic industries transfer pollution control costs to consumers).
18 Some businesses are able to pass on to the consumer the entire cost of buying new
pollution control equipment, altering production processes, replacing product lines, and
paying higher taxes. Others can pass along little if any of such outlay because of price
pressures from intra-industry, inter-industry, and international competition. Cleanup
Costs: Who Will Pay?, Tm MAGAZINE OF WAI ST., Sept. 27, 1971, at 27.
14 An ecologist at Chile's Austral University observed that in less developed economies governments "resist establishing controls that could limit in any way the rate of industrialization." Statement of Francesco di Castri, quoted in Gillette, Human Environment
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and, as a result, the prices of competing goods of those nations do not
reflect increased production costs resulting from pollution control efforts.1 5 If American industry, faced with the financial burden of pollution control, seeks to transfer its increased production costs to foreign
16
consumers, it may jeopardize its international market.
The loss of foreign markets is obviously a prospect that American
industry will view with alarm; however, the potential loss of large segments of the domestic market because of required pollution control
expenditures is an equally serious threat to American industrial economy. If the price of American goods must be raised in order to amortize
the cost of pollution control, then that price may very well be noncompetitive in domestic as well as foreign markets. Absent protectionist
17
trade barriers which will increase the price of foreign goods, American
consumers will have a financial incentive to import goods manufactured8
in nations that have not set onerous pollution control standards.'
Conference: Slow Start Toward Stockholm, 172 SCIENCE 1011, 1012 (1971). See generally
May, Preserving a Human Environment at the World Scale, AiP JOURNAL, July 1971, at

267; note 32 infra.
15 Even with the unlikely implementation of international pollution control laws,
differences in the norm of cleanliness may create wide variances in the cost of production.
A recent study indicates that in some industries the cost of purifying an effluent to a 99%
level may be double that of a 90% standard. GATT Fears Pollution Controls Could Result
in Establishment of New Barriers to World Trade, 200 OtL, PAINT & DRUG RFTR., Aug.
30, 1971, at 43.
16 Some estimates place the loss to the nation's international trade directly attributable to pollution control engendered price increases at $700 million per year. COUNCIL
QUALITY, U.S. DEx'T OF COMMERCE & ENVIRONMEwAL PROTECTION
AGENCY, THF. ECONOMIC IMPACT OF POLLUTION CONTROL 14 (1972).
Although not all observers are pessimistic, the hopes of continued strength in American trade seem to depend on a relatively weak counterbalancing factor. As one study observed: "Our initial technological lead, coupled with growing foreign concern over polution, might lead to substantial receipts in our balance of payments in the form of exports
of pollution abatement equipment and the licensing of related technology." ECONOMIC
ON ENVIRONMENTAL

POLICY REPORT 132.

17 See notes 84-37 and accompanying text infra.

18 The actual costs of industrial production are not always apparent. Certain expenses

may be shifted to the public as mutual consumers of air and water resources rather than
retained as industry-borne costs. As pollution of the environment increases, such production "externalities" are evidenced in greater incidence of disease and in water and air
contamination which leads to higher purification costs.
While there is a tendency toward this diseconomy in industrial production, it is not
invariably harmful. In small quantities, air and water pollution is eliminated from the
environment naturally through precipitation or chemical and biological degradation.
Public tolerance of certain externalities, moreover, may permit industry to lower environmental quality. In any event, the relative insignificance of industrial pollution in some
instances or the natural cleansing effect in others may eliminate externalities of industrial
production or at least reduce them to a level sufficient to allow precedence to other, more
immediate economic and social objectives. See generally A. KNEESE & B. BowER, MANAGING
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These imported goods may well erode the domestic market of other
American industries. The United States will in effect be unintentionally
"exporting" pollution through its purchases from uncontrolled foreign
industry.19 In short, America's efforts to fight pollution may seriously
undermine the competitive position of its own industries in both world
20
and domestic markets.
Higher production costs of American primary industries may also
injure the trade of secondary industries, since pollution costs will be
passed on to such industries in their capacity as purchasers of primary
industry goods. Thus, there is a possibility that the whole price structure
of American goods may rise. 21 As a result, the competitiveness in international trade of goods and services far removed from initial pollution
control costs may also be damaged.
B. Domestic and Foreign Responses
Pollution control efforts will differ among nations according to
the assimilative capacity of each country's environment, the relative
balance of its national economic and social objectives, and its technological and industrial levels. 22 The cost of production in various nations
will reflect these differences in pollution control factors. Certainly, the
implementation of stringent environmental protection programs in
other countries will benefit American industry by reducing or eliminating the cause of the competitive handicap of American goods28 and by
mitigating the dangers of disruptive shifts in our economy. Similar cost
increases caused by international implementation of uniform pollution
control programs will tend to preserve present competitive positions or
WATER QUALITY: ECONOMICS, TECHNOLOGY, INsrrruTIoNs 89-90, 97-98 (1968), C. MEYERS &

A. TARLOCK, SELECTED LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 1-19
(1971); TAx FOUNDATION, INC., POLLUTION CONTROL: PERSPECTIVES ON THE GovERNmENT ROLE
16-18 (1971).
19 Some nations are not so haphazard in the export of pollution. Japan is a prime example of a country seeking to export its most polluting industries. See Economic Comm'n
for Latin America, The Human Environment and Development in Latin America 71, U.N.
Doc. ST/ECLA/Conf.40/L.2 (1971) (iron production); N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1972, at 11,
col. I (paper mill). See also note 30 infra. Concerning the overall effect of pollution on
the world environment, see Humpstone, supra note 8, at 331-32.
20 In the absence of national protective measures which would preserve the competitive position of present domestic industries, at least in their home market, the national
economy would necessarily adjust to meet foreign competition. This adjustment would
mean less production in high pollution and high cost industries and, perhaps, a shift of
investment capital and labor from these industries altogether. See generally ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY, supra note 11, at 5-1 to 5-3.
21 Russell & Landsberg, supra note 5, at 1310.
22 Id. at 1312.
23 See notes 14-20 and accompanying text supra.
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at least will allow gradual movement of labor and capital in adjustment
to weakening markets. Implementation of pollution standards in de24
veloping countries has met serious resistance, however.
International agreements, of course, could establish uniform environmental quality standards and perhaps create innovative methods
of financing pollution control. 25 Political and economic difficulties, 2
however, compounded by inadequate scientific knowledge upon which
to base a system of norms,2 7 probably constitute an insurmountable
obstacle to effective international agreement in this area. International
acceptance of broad policy statements furnishes no real solution to the
world-wide pollution problem. 28 Any modification of environmental
policy that causes economic repercussions will generate intense reaction,
particularly among developing nations. 29 It may be that standards of
pollution control, in any form, will be possible only in narrowly deSee note 14 supra and notes 30 & 33 infra.
Jones, The Economics of a Global Antipollution Code, N.Y. Times, May 2, 1971,
at 3, col 1; CnmicAr. WEan, May 5, 1971, at 24.
Several types of standards have been proposed. A discharge standard is a quantitive
norm of unacceptable pollutant level from a specific source (e.g., amount of certain gas
emissions in automobile exhaust). This standard is fundamentally different from quality or
ambient standards which establish a tolerable pollution level within the environment
itself (e.g., amount of mercury or DDT in the oceans). Operational standards are norms
governing how activities which may lead to pollution are conducted (e.g., construction and
navigation of oil tankers).
26 Closely associated with the establishment of pollution standards is the sensitive
issue of monitoring. The placement of measuring devices may be unobjectionable when
intended for researching the patterns of natural currents and dissemination of substances,
since such scientific pursuits do not threaten industrial interference. But inspection associated with regulation raises conflict and suspicion. See generally Intergovernmental Working Group on Monitoring or Surveillance, U.N. Doc. A/ConL48/PC.11/Add.1 (1971).
27 For a discussion of the technical complexity of establishing norms, see TAx FOUNDATION, INC., supra note 18, at 26-30.
28 The United Nations Declaration on the Human Environment, which is an international statement of principles and goals of environmental protection, met considerable
opposition in its formative stages. See Intergovernmental Working Group on the Declaration of The Human Environment, Report, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.48/PG.12, Annex II
(1971). The issues of population growth and product distribution and consumption manifest themselves differently in various regions and nations. While in some countries the
problems are overpopulation and excessive consumption, in others there is a need to
increase birth rates and consumption. N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1971, at 60, col. 1.
29 To minimize dissension among nations, or at least that between developed and
developing nations, George F. Kennan has suggested that "leading industrial and maritime nations" unilaterally create an agency to analyze and guide world environmental
programs. Kennan, To Prevent a World Wasteland: A Proposal, 48 FOREIGN ArFAis 401
(1970). Such a solution would avoid the complexities and delay accompanying broader international involvement and, conversely, the disruptive effects of controls imposed by one
nation alone.
24
25
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fined economic areas among a limited number of nations with similar
interests.
In light of this diversity of national economic, social, and environmental circumstances, it is not surprising that some countries are
already establishing themselves as "pollution havens."30 Lax pollution
control standards will undoubtedly aid industrially immature nations
which, because of inefficiency, less advanced technology, or diseconomies of scale, suffer in trade competition with developed countries.3 1
The United States will face increasing competition in international
trade from countries expanding their industry at the cost of environmental resources. 32 Although this trade advantage may be only temporary, developing countries may willingly accept a short range policy
permitting environmental deterioration as a necessary cost of industrialization.3 3
30 Russell & Landsberg, supra note 5, at 1310. The United States serves as a haven for
Japanese industries:
To the extent that [coal and lumber] exports are stimulated by lower prices, made
possible by a lack of strip-mining regulation and of control of timber overcutting,
the United States is functioning as a pollution haven, suffering land erosion, acid
mine drainage, reduction of wildlife stocks, and disruption of natural vistas in
order to support domestic employment in export industries.
id.
31 The willingness of developing nations to suffer harmful industrial pollutants to
gain the immediate benefits of employment and favorable trade balance is particularly
tragic since their poverty makes the deleterious impact of pollution and environmental
degradation even more pronounced. See notes 34-35 and accompanying text infra. The difficulties of reconciling the aims of environmental protection and industrial development
are discussed in Kasdan, Third World War-Environment Versus Development?, 26 R.cORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 454 (1971); Panel of Experts Convened by the Secretary-General of the
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, The Founex Report on Development and Environment, INT'L CONCILIATION, Jan. 1972, at 7.
32 The outcries by ardent environmentalists against the inherent "ecological immorality" of development's by-products in their own countries, are regarded by
many leaders of developing states as smokescreens behind which the rich will
eventually attempt to justify either a reduced commitment to the economic
development of the poor on the one hand, or heightened trade barriers against
products produced in the "environmental sweatshops" of the poor on the other.
INT'L BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT, Tim WORLD BANK AND THE WORLD
ENVIRONmENT 5 (1971).
33 Statement by Robert S. McNamara, at a meeting of the Commission on International
Trade and Investment Policy (United States), in Washington, D.C., Feb. 25, 1971.
Erosion of the competitive position of industrial countries in international trade does
not necessarily benefit developing countries, however. A shift of resources to pollution
control may create unavoidable increases in the cost of manufactured goods required by
developing countries and obtainable only from the United States or other major industrial
nations. Economic Comm'n for Latin America, supra note 19, at 71. Even though an
emerging nation may develop its own industry or gain industry by the relocation of pollution causing manufacturing processes which are faced with high pollution costs and adverse
competition at home, the nation has also invited environmental problems which may over-
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II
IMPORT BURDENS AS A POSSIBLE SOLUTION

Some observers fear that America may attempt to maintain a trade
position competitive with that of countries not adopting stringent pollution control measures through the implementation of protectionist
trade restrictions. 4 Individual industries have been strong advocates
of trade protectionism in particular product fields.35 The sweeping
impact of pollution control requirements, however, may induce a correspondingly wide protectionist response from all sectors of the American economy. 6
whelm the already inadequate resources of its emerging economy. If political and economic
pressure from industrial nations requires that pollution control measures be taken in
developing countries, the balance of payments of these nations would be adversely affected
by the added cost and financial drain associated -with the initial construction or modification of industrial plants.
Pollution considerations may also have an effect on foreign investment and foreign
aid. Although there is the possibility that financial resources once available for investment
in developing countries will be retained in order to install control facilities in developed
nations, of more immediate concern is the threat that pollution control standards will be
imposed as a condition for loans. The World Bank has recently created the post of Environmental Adviser to study the adverse effects of foreign aid on the environment. See
INT'L BANK FOR RECONSr~uCTION AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note $2, at 6. Developing countries have been highly critical of this imposition of added expense, especially in light of
their already unfavorable balance of trade, less exploited environment, desire for industrial
development, and sensitivity about their national sovereignty. See generally Panel of Experts Convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations Conference on the Human
Environment, supra note 31, at 21-33.
84 See, e.g., GATT Fears Pollution Controls Could Result in Establishment of New
Barriers to World Trade, supra note 15, at 43.
85 See Greenwald, Protectionism in America, in 63 DE,'T STATE BULL. 724, 725 (1970).
S3 In a different context it has been said that "(f]irms are opposed to changes in a
status quo which ensures comfortable profits, while labor unions fear the dislocation which
a revamping of the industrial structure would entail." Statement by Robert S. McNamara,
supra note 88, at 6. The same principle is applicable to pollution control developments.
Some authorities have suggested that lax pollution laws in competing nations be
treated as subsidies to foreign industry, justifying American imposition of countervailing
duties on imports from those countries. See Vasek, International Environmental Damage
Control: Some Proposalsfor the Second Best of All Possible Worlds, 59 Ky. L.J. 678, 689
(1971). Another commentator agrees that surcharges on imports "not subject to the extra
costs of production under environmentally safe conditions" are a distinct possibility. Statement of Augustine Marusi, quoted in CHEMicAL WExK, May 5, 1971, at 24. The difficulty in
measuring the extent of foreign "assistance" and the danger of retaliation for what may
appear to be an American violation of international trade agreements make this suggestion
unworkable. The imposition of tariffs, quotas, or duties would likely be met by reciprocal
exactions from the exporting country and thus be self-defeating. In recognition of this
danger, the United States Commission on International Trade and Investment Policy recommended that "the United States itself avoid, and oppose internationally, the imposition
of general systems of border adjustments (export rebates and import surcharges) for the
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Although there are appealing arguments in favor of discouraging
or burdening imports from countries imposing weak pollution control
requirements, 37 the long range cost of such trade protectionism might
well exceed its immediate economic benefits. The imposition of tariffs
and other trade barriers tends to destroy the comparative advantages
of an exporting nation's production. According to free trade theory,
this distortion decreases overall world income, since each country is
unable to export the goods it can produce with greatest comparative
efficiency. 88 Absent response from other trading nations, the United
States may derive certain immediate benefits from trade barriers, yet
the long term effect would be to lower both domestic and foreign income. 39
If protection of domestic industry is necessary to ease the immediate impact of foreign competition and the initial costs of pollution
control, less provocative measures than tariff and certain nontariff trade
barriers should be employed.
III
THE SUBSIY SOLUTION

A.

Background and Domestic Considerations

The payment of production subsidies to industry has been frequently proposed as a way to preserve America's competitive position
in international trade while promoting environmental quality.40 Alpurpose of offsetting pollution control costs." ECONOMIC POLICY REPORT 135 (emphasis
omitted). The Commission went on to observe that "[i]f other countries do use border
adjustments to offset costs of production pollution control, we recommend that the
United States consider imposing compensatory duties and rebates to protect the legitimate
interests of our export and import-competing industries." Id. (emphasis omitted).
37 Some observers say that world growth and consumption practices have assumed
such inertia, volume, and complexity that even immediate measures may be too late to
stop ecological collapse. See generally P. EHRLICH & A. EHRLICH, POPULATION, RESOURCES,
ENVIRONMENT: ISSUES IN HUMAN ECOLOGY (1970); R. FALK, THIS ENDANGERED PLANET (1971).
38 See Barcel6, Antidumping Laws as Barriers to Trade-The United States and the
InternationalAntidumping Code, 57 CORNELL L. REV. 498, 499-500 (1972).
39 See note 7 supra.
40 The United States has had an extensive history of subsidies to industry: maritime
trade, air and land transport carriers, agriculture, and research and development. SENATE
FINANCE COMMITrEE, 90TH CONG., 2D SESs., COMPENDIUM

OF PAPERS ON LEGISLATIVE OVER-

SIGHT: REVIEW OF U.S. TRADE POLICIES 34-44 (1968). In the area of pollution control, state
and federal governments have permitted special tax incentives and write-offs and low cost
access to municipal waste treatment facilities. U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, THE ECONOMICS OF
CLEAN WATER 6 (1970); see A. KNEEsE & B. BOWER, supra note 18, at 175-76; C. MEvxRs & A.
TARLOCK, supra note 18, at 181-83. Not surprisingly, a recent poll revealed that almost

INTERNATIONAL

TRADE

though argument persists over what form of governmental pollution
control aid would best serve the needs of society, 41 the purpose of such
aid in any form is to compensate industry for pollution control costs
in order to avert adverse trade effects.
Since subsidies would tend to remove pollution control costs from
the economics of production, they have the attraction of being the most
direct solution to the economic problems resulting from the implementation of environmental quality standards. Moreover, since the abatement of pollution serves the public good with little direct economic
value to the producer, control of pollution can be considered a social
benefit to which all should contribute. Conversely, although some governmental aid may be necessary to reduce the initial costs of production
change, numerous arguments on both the domestic and international
levels militate against direct grants to industry.43 The critical question
is whether these reservations outweigh the advantages of the subsidy
approach.
The most serious criticism of subsidies is that they do not provide
a long term incentive for the abatement of pollution.44 Governmental
intervention admittedly might tend to preserve inefficient and polluting industries and their associated vested interests. Yet such intervention need not merely ensconce a rigid status quo when applied only to
mitigate short term financial burdens in order to accomplish extensive
reallocation of resources and capital in an economic and efficient
75% of the businessmen questioned believe that government tax credits, grants, and subsidies are the most effective incentives for pollution abatement. Diamond, supra note 12,
at 172. For further discussion of United States and foreign subsidies, see R. BALDWIVN,
NONTARIFF DIsToRTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 119, 122-23 (1970); A. KNEESE & B. BoWER,
supra note 18, at 175-78; SENATE FINANCE CoamrmITTEE, supra at 342-45; TAx FOUNDATION,
INC., supra note 18, at 31-34.
41 The subsidy concept is subject to various interpretations. It has been construed to
include tax benefits and grants from both state and federal governments. See notes 55-57
and accompanying text infra. For further discussions of the subject, see C. MEYERs &
A. TARLocK, supra note 18, at 176-83; Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing
Government Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARv. L.
REv. 705 (1970).
42 According to Edgar B. Speer, President, United States Steel Corporation, "[w]hatever relief provisions are adopted, [Congress] should recognize that expenditures for these
[pollution control] facilities, including land, buildings, and equipment, are not a productive investment." Quoted in IRON AGE, Oct. 30, 1969, at 19.
43 See notes 44-46 and accompanying text infra.
44 Although it must assist in eliminating the large backlog of capital require-

ments, the Federal Government cannot and should not finance local waste treatment indefinitely... Charges based on use of treatment facilities provide long-run
incentives for the abatement of pollution.
PRESWENT'S COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADvIsERs, ANNUAL REPORT 124 (1966).
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manner.45 Subsidy programs, including tax credits, exemptions and
amortization, low cost loans, and grants, are widely used by both state
and federal governments to encourage pollution control.4 6 The danger
remains, however, that such aid will not resolve the basic problem, but
will only postpone the inevitable shift of the production resources.
B.

Subsidies in the Context of GATT
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)47 was
created to lower tariff and nontariff barriers to international trade.48
GATT's treatment of subsidies, however, reflects the general complexity, imprecision, and confusion encountered in any attempt to regulate
49
nontariff barriers.
Since subsidies can assume varying forms and, in many cases, sustain honest disagreement as to whether they do, in fact, create trade
45 These domestic concerns may be of secondary importance, however, when international reactions are considered. See notes 58-62 and accompanying text infra.
46 Note, Economic Incentives for Pollution Abatement: Applying Theory to Practice,
12 ARIz. L. Rav. 511, 517-21, 525-34 (1970).
47 Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. pt. 5, at All, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 (1950)
[hereinafter cited as GATT]. In 1947, 22 nations endorsed GATT as a preliminary stage
to ratification of a permanent institution called the International Trade Organization.
When the latter failed to be formed, GATT continued and has evolved into the principal
regulatory institution in international trade for over 70 nations, including the United
States. For a detailed historical background, see G. CURZON, MULTILATERAL COMMERCIAL
DIPLOMACY 15-33 (1965); K. DAM, THE GATT: LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
ORGANIZATION 10-16 (1970); J. JACaSON, WoRm TRADE AND Trn LAw oF GATT 35-57 (1969).
GATT has reduced the average American tariff from a high in 1930 of 50% to 9% in
1972. This percentage compares to 8.6% in the Common Market countries, 10.8% in the
United Kingdom (prior to entry into the Common Market), and 10.7% in Japan. R.
BALDWIN, supra note 40, at 1; Greenwald, supra note 35, at 724.
48 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, ANALYSIS OF GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFs AND TRADE 1-3
(1947).
49 Nontariff barriers include such disparate devices as quantitative restrictions,
arbitrary customs practices, restrictive government procurement policies, and unreasonable application of health and safety standards. They even include such
nongovernmental practices as industrial standards and specifications that can make
the use of imported products more difficult.
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(1969). For a list of nontariff barriers and unfair trade practices affecting trade, see Hearing
on Nomination of Carl J. Gilbert To Be Special Representative for Trade Negotiations
Before the Senate Finance Comm., 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 31-32 (1969). See generally R.
BALDWIN, supra note 40.
Governmental subsidies are designed to improve the domestic welfare by stimulating
growth in depressed industries, by mitigating problems caused by diseconomies of scale,
by cushioning the financial impact of new regulations, and by removing other inefficiencies
and handicaps of industrial producers. Id. at 181. Such subsidies, however, may well have
the effect of discouraging imports by making the domestic market artificially competitive.
Id. They may thus engender a retaliatory foreign response which will diminish the economic
benefits the subsidy was designed to achieve. The extent to which GATT will permit
retaliation against American subsidies is not yet clear.

INTERNATIONAL TRADE

distortions, GATT contains no explicit prohibition of either direct or
indirect governmental grants to industry. According to Article XVI,
GATT contracting parties are constrained only by requirements of
notification and consultation.
If any contracting party grants or maintains any subsidy, including any form of income or price support, which operates directly or indirectly to increase exports of any product from, or to
reduce imports of any product into, its territory, it shall notify the
-Contracting Parties in writing of the extent and nature of the subsidization, of the estimated effect of the subsidization on the quantity of the affected product or products imported into or exported
from its territory and of the circumstances making the subsidization necessary. In any case in which it is determined that serious
prejudice to the interests of any other contracting party is caused
or threatened by any such subsidization, the contracting party
granting the subsidy shall, upon request, discuss with the other contracting party or parties concerned, or with the Contracting Parties, the possibility of limiting the subsidization. 50
This GATT provision seems sufficiently broad to encompass all
types of pollution control subsidies. On its face it requires notification
or consultation only when a domestic subsidy increases exports or reduces imports. In 1960, however, a working party on the question of
subsidies observed that "it is not sufficient to consider increased exports
or reduced imports only in an historical sense."'51' The panel was referring to a 1948 interpretation of GATT which provided that the expression "increased exports" in Article XVI of the agreement included
"the concept of maintaining exports at a level higher than would otherwise exist in the absence of the subsidy, as made clear in... the Havana
Charter."52 The panel added that such an interpretation should also
apply in determining the effect on imports, and concluded that "[t]he
criterion is therefore what would happen in the absence of a subsidy." 53
50 GATT pt. 2, art. XVI, 61 Stat. pt. 5, A51-A52 (1947).
51 GATT, BAsIc INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS 191 (9th Supp. 1961).

52 2 id. at 44 (1950). The applicable part of the Havana Charter reads as follows:
If any Member grants or maintains any subsidy, including any form of income
or price support, which operates directly or indirectly to maintain or increase
exports of any product from, or to reduce, or prevent an increase in, imports of any
product into, its territory, the Member shall notify the Organization in writing
of the extent and nature of the subsidization, of the estimated effect of the subsidization on the quantity of the affected product or products imported into or exported from its territory and of the circumstances making the subsidization
necessary.
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, HAVANA CHARTER FOR AN INTERNATIONAL TRADE ORGANIZATION 23
(1948).
53 GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECrE DOCUMENTS 191 (9th Supp. 1961) (emphasis
in original).
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A pollution control subsidy would result, of course, in increased imports and decreased exports.54
The term "subsidy" has also assumed a broad and flexible meaning.
In 1961 the Panel on Subsidies noted
that it was neither necessary nor feasible to seek an agreed interpretation of what constituted a subsidy. It would probably be impossible to arrive at a definition which would at the same time include
all measures that fall within the intended meaning of the term in
Article XVI without including others not so intended.... In any

event the Panel felt that the lack of a precise definition had not,
in practice, interferred [sic] with the operation of Article XVI.15
Another 1961 report observed that "the word 'subsidies' covered not
only actual payments, but also measures having an equivalent effect." 56
The report went on to note that duties or taxes imposed or exempted
equally on exported as well as domestically consumed products should
57
not be considered a subsidy.
Although there is a danger that competing nations may impose
58
countervailing duties in response to pollution control subsidies, this
possibility is less likely than if tariff barriers were used to protect America's competitive position. The lack of cognizable criteria in GATT for
54 The breadth of this interpretation has particular significance in relation to Article
VI (see notes 60-62 and accompanying text infra) since it could possibly justify countervailing duties against a trade distorting subsidy, even in the absence of a showing that such
aid had materially altered the status quo.
55 GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SE.LECTE DoCumENTs 208 (10th Supp. 1962).
56 GATT, ANTI-DUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTIES 20 (1961).
57 Id.

This distinction may be significant in determining the kind of government aid selected
to meet pollution control. While the terms of GATT may be broad enough to include
most forms of direct government grants for such a purpose, tax benefits with the same
result may invoke less adverse foreign reaction. This observation gains added weight from
Article VI, para. 3, which prohibits countervailing duties in response to tax benefits
applied equally to goods destined for both domestic and international markets:

No product of the territory of any contracting party imported into the
territory of any other contracting party shall be subject to anti-dumping or
countervailing duty by reason of the exemption of such product from duties or
taxes borne by the like product when destined for consumption in the country of
origin or exportation, or by reason of the refund of such duties or taxes.
GATT pt. 2, art. VI, para. 3, 61 Stat. pt. 5, A24 (1947). Compare id. art. III, para. 1, 61
Stat. pt. 5, AI8 (1947).
58 A countervailing duty may be defined as a surtax, in addition to normal
customs duties, imposed on imports whose exportation has been facilitated through
a bounty or similar assistance in the exporting country. The additional duty is
intended to neutralize the foreign subsidy, and thus prevent injury to the producers of comparable products in the importing country who operate without the
benefit of such bounties.
Ehrenhaft, Protection Against International Price Discrimination: United States Countervailing and Antidumping Duties, 58 CoLum. L. Rant. 44, 54 (1958).
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determining the circumstances in which countervailing duties will be
justified tends to render unpredictable the international response in
the event that subsidies are introduced.
In instances where "serious prejudice" to the interests of contracting parties is caused or threatened by a subsidy, GATT Article XVI
provides that "the contracting party granting the subsidy shall, upon
request, discuss . . . the possibility of limiting the subsidization."59
Under the GATT terms, the objecting nation may make a unilateral
determination of injury, without consulting other contracting parties
of GATT. The term "serious prejudice" in this context is not defined
by GATT nor by amplifying studies.
Article VI, on the other hand, allows contracting parties to impose
countervailing duties to neutralize a "bounty or subsidy determined to
have been granted, directly or indirectly, on the manufacture, production or export of such product in the country of origin or exportation,
including any special subsidy to the transportation of a particular
product."6 0 The same Article restricts this authority by requiring that
before duties are imposed the objecting party must determine that "the
effect of the dumping or subsidization, as the case may be, is such as to
cause or threaten material injury to an established domestic industry,
or is such as to retard materially the establishment of a domestic industry" 0 1l
GATT does not more explicitly define the extent of injury necessary to justify retaliatory duties. Thus, there exist no guidelines by
which to determine whether or not a particular foreign imposition of
59 GATT pt. 2, art. XVI, 61 Stat. pt. 5, A51-A52 (1947).

60 Id. art. VI, para. 8, 61 Stat. pt. 5, A24 (1947), as amended, 62 Stat. 8682 (1948). While
Article VI is the principal remedy for foreign subsidies, two other Articles are pertinent.
Article XIX provides that if for any reason "any product is being imported into the
territory of [a] contracting party in such increased quantities and under such conditions
as to cause or threaten serious injury to domestic producers," the party may suspend GATT
obligations and concessions upon proper notice. Id. art. XIX, para. l(a), 61 Stat. pt. 5,
A58 (1947). Article XXIII allows an escape from GATT obligations if any benefit accruing to the contracting party under the agreement is being nullified or impaired by
foreign subsidies or other measures. Id. art. XXIII, para. 1, 61 Stat. pt. 5, A64 (1947).
See also GATT, BAsIc INSTRUMENTS AND SELEcmr

DocuMENTs 224 (3d Supp. 1955).

61 GATT pt. 2, art. VI, para. 6, 61 Stat. pt. 5, A24 (1947), as amended, 62 Stat. 8688
(1948).
At the outset of their discussions on the use of the injury concept, the Group
stressed that anti-dumping measures should only be applied when material injury,
i.e., substantial injury, is caused or threatens to be caused. It was agreed that no
precise definitions or set of rules could be given in respect of the injury concept,
but that a common standard ought to be adopted in applying this criterion and
that decisions about injury should be taken by authorities at a high level.
GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS 149-50 (8th Supp. 1960).
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countervailing duties is justified. 62 Even though subsidies may provide
a mild alternative to disruptive tariff and nontariff barriers, they may
easily lead to abuses for which countervailing duties would be the
proper and legitimate response. It would be nonsensical, however, to
argue that uncertainties over what degree of injury will justify retaliatory duties should preclude the imposition of subsidies in all cases.
CONCLUSION

The United States must continue its policy of promoting pollution
control efforts in areas where technology and political objectives allow
agreement. But it should be apparent from the diverse reactions possible to the subsidy of industrial pollution control and the uncertain
terms of international trade agreements that a more effective international framework of assessment and negotiation should be designed.
Problems presented by pollution control subsidies illustrate the
need for stronger, more centralized, and more responsive GATT administration. An arbitration procedure or arbitral commission should
be created in GATT and charged with hearing complaints and assessing
the trade effects of pollution control subsidies or similar nontariff distortions. Ameliorating the international trade effects of pollution control subsidies may be one fundamental key to the success of national
efforts. GATT can be put to yet one more use: aiding nations in their
attempts to improve the environment.
William Scott Ferguson
62 Some national laws, such as those of the United States, do not require a finding
of material injury before imposing countervailing duties. See, e.g., Tariff Act of 1930, ch.
497, § 303, 46 Stat. 687 (1980), as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1970). Such a provision is inconsistent with GATT but is permitted by the Protocol of Provisional Application exempting "existing legislation." J. JACKSON, supra note 47, at 425.

